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[Sac. No. 6914. In Bank. Feb.l0,1959.]

GEDDES & SMITH, INC. (a Corporation), Appellant, v.
SAINT PAUL MERCURY INDEMNITY COMPANY
(a Corporation), Respondent.
;

[1] Insurance-Remedies of Injured Person Against Insurer-De- '
fenses.-An insurer that has been notified of an action and
refuses to defend on the ground that the alleged claim is not
within the policy coverage is bound by a judgment in the
action, in the absence of fraud or collusion, as to all material
findings of fact essential to the judgment of liability of the
insured, but is not bound as to issues not necessarily adjudieated in the prior action, and can present any defenses not
inconsistent 'with the judgment agninst the insured.
[2] Judgments-Res Judicata-Proof of Judgment and Jrla.ttera
Determined.-Where the court's findings on issues necessarily
adjudicated in a prior action are the same as the findings in

Melt. Dig. References: [1] Insurance, § 334(2); [2] Judgments,
§ 445; [3, 7] Insurance, § 189; [4] Words and Phrases; [5, 6]
Insurance. § 181.
'
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[3]

[4]

i [6]

, [6]

the prior action, the findings on such issues are supported by
the record of the prior judgment, whether it be considered M
conclusive on those issues or only as presumptive evidence
thereon.
Insurance-Risks and Causes of Loss-Indemnity Insurance-Injury to Property.-Although a property damage liability
policy had an endorsement excluding liability for "the handling or use of, the existence of any condition in or a warranty
of goods or products • • • sold • • • by the named insured
occurring after the insured has relinquished possession thereof
to others," the specific cancellation of this endorsement by a
subsequent endorsement did not necessarily provide coverage
to the extent theretofore excluded, so that damages for breach
of warranty of doors sold by the insured would be covered,
where each of the endorsements contained a provision that
nothing thel'ein would vary, waive or extend any of the
provisions or limitations of the policy, which specifically covered damages ''because of injury to or destruction of property,
including the loss of use thereof, caused by accident," and
excluded damages because of "injury to or destruction of (1)
any goods or products ••• sold ••• by the Insured ••• out
of which the accident arises."
Words and Phrases-uAccident."-An "accident" is a casualty
-something out of the usual course of events and which happens suddenly and unexpectedly and without design of the
person injured. It includes any event which takes place
without the foresight or expectation of the person acted
upon or affected by the event.
Insurance-Accident Insurance-What Constitutes Accident~
-An "accident," as a source and cause of damage to property
within the terms of an accident policy, is an unexpected, unforeseen or undesigned happening or consequence from either
a known or an unknown cause.
ld.-Accident Insurance-What Oonstitutes Accident.-Under
a policy insuring against liability for damages because of
injury to property caused by accident and specifically covering doors manufactured and sold by the insured, the damage
suffered by a building contractor in failing to meet contract
commitments because of defective aluminum doors puuhased
from the insured for use in houses constructed by the contractor was "caused by accident" within the meaning of the
policy where the door failures were unexpected, undesigned
and unforeseen, were not the result of normal deterioration,
but occurred long before any properly constructed door might
be expected to wear out or collapse, and occurred suddenly.

[5] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Insurllnce, § 404; Am,Jur., Insurance, § 931.
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----------------------------------------[7] Id.-Risks and Causes of Loss-Indemnity lnsurance-IDjury
to Property.-Undcr a policy insuring against liability for

damages "because of injury to or destruction of property," the
'Word "property" refers to physical or tangible property, not
good 'Will or a business entity. Any breach of contract may
harm the business of the injured party and, if sufficiently
serious, may affect his good will, but BUeh damages are not
commonly thought of as injuries to or destruction of property
within the meaning of a public liability insurance policy.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County. John Quincy Brown, Judge. Reversed
with directions.
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Action to recover on an insurance policy.
defendant reversed with directions.

J~dgment

for

Riggins, Rossi & Kongsgaard and Clarence N. Riggins for
Appellant.
Desmond, McLaughlin & Russell and Jerome M. McLaugh-1
lin for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for defendant in an action to recover on an insurance policy issued
by defendant to California Aluminum Products, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Aluminum Products.
Plaintiff, a building contractor, ordered 760 aluminum
doors, door jambs, and attached hardware from Aluminum
Products in November, 1950. The doors were to be used in
76 houses being constructed by plaintiff in the cities of Napa
and Fairfield. The deliveries of the doors occurred from
December, 1950, to February, 1951. The doors were kept in
storage for some time, and plaintiff began to install them in
May, 1951, and installed all of them within a few months.
After installation, defects appeared in some of the doors
within a few days and in others after various periods of time
ranging up to six months. Some of the doors sagged on their
hinges and dragged on the floors. Some went out of shape.
Parts of some of the doors fell out. Some doors could not be
closed and others that were closed became locked in place
and could not be opened. Plaintiff notified .Aluminum Products, which undertook to supply other doorI'. Many of the
Hew doors had the same defects as tIle old. SOllie were found
[7J See Cal.Jur.2d, Insurance, §~ 506, 509 et seq.
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damaged when received by plaintiff. Some could not be used
hecause they were unsuitable; for example, 22 doors Rhipped
as replacement-bathroom doors wcre equipped with chime,
and letter drops. Aluminum Products shipped a total of
2,604 doors before enough suitable doors were obtained, and
plaintiff was engaged in handling, storing, repairing, removing and installing doors for over a year.
In May, 1952, plaintiff brought an action against Aluminum
Products alleging breach of warranty and negligence. Plaintiff alleged that by reason of expenses incurred in removing,
installing, repairing, storing, and shipping doors, expenses
incurred in office overhead during the time it was engaged
in settling disputes arising out of installation of the doors and
loss of profit, it was damaged in excess of $100,000. Aluminum
Products notified defendant and asked it to defend the action.
Defendant refused to do so on the ground that damage to the
doors was excluded from coverage under the policy issued
to Aluminum Products. Aluminum Products then undertook
the defense of the action. It denied the allegations of the
complaint and filed a cross-complaint for some $8,000 alleged
to be unpaid on the doors. When that action came on for
trial, counsel for both parties stipulated findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Pursuant thereto, the court found that
the allegations of the complaint were true, that nothing was
unpaid on the doors, entered judgment on the complaint for
plaintiff in the sum of $100,000 and costs, and entered judgment against Aluminum Products on the cross-complaint.
Plaintiff then brought this action against defendant to
recover the amount of the judgment under the insurance
policy issued by defendant to Aluminum Products. The
judgment roll of the prior action was admitted into evidence.
The policy in question was issued for the period from Kay
1, 1951, to Kay 1, 1952. Under the terms of the policy
defendant was obligated to defend any actions against Aluminum Products alleging damages within the policy coverage.
[1] An insurer that has been notified of an action and reo
fuses to defend on the ground that the alleged claim is not
within the policy coverage is bound by a judgment in the
action, in the absence of fraud or collusion, as to all material
findings of fact essential to the judgment of liability of the
insured. The insurer is not bound, however, as to issues not
necessarily adjudicated in the prior action and can still
present any defenses not inconsistent with the judgment

)
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against the insured. (Sawyer v. Sunset MutuaZ Life Ins.
Co., 8 Ca1.2d 492, 499-501 [66 P.2d 641]; Arltll.'ovich v.
St. Paul-Mercury Indcm. Co., 150 Cal.App.2d 312, 320-321
[310 P.2d 461] ; see Rest., Judgments, § 107a, pp. 513-518.)
[2] Defendant contends that the judgment against Alumi'num' Products is onJy presumptive evidence of the matters
necessarily adjudicated therein because it was a stipulated'
judgment. This question need not be considered since the
trial court's findings in the instant case on issues necessarily
adjudicated in the prior action are the same as the findings
in the prior action. Thus, t.he findings on sueh issues are
supported by the record of the prior judgment, whether it
be considered as conclusive on those issues or only as presumptive evidence thereon. The is.cmes that defendant litigated in the trial court and that are raised in this appeal
concern the scope of policy coverage and were not adjudicated
in the prior action.
The pertinent provisions of the policy are as follows. Under
Coverage "C," "Property Damage Liability other than Automobile," defendant agreed: "To pay on behalf of the Insured
all sums which the insured shall become obligated to pay by
reason of the liability imposed upon him by law or contract
because of injury to or destruction of property, including the
loss of use thereof, caused by accident." Under "Exclusions"
it is provided that: ., This Policy does not apply: ... (e) under
Coverage C, to injury to or destruction of (1) allY goods or
products ••• sold ••. by the Insured . • . out of which the
accident arises." Endorsement number 1, effective May I,
1951, entitled ., Exclusion of Products Liability," provides:
"It is agreed that the policy does not apply to: (1) the handling or use of, the existence of any condition in or a warranty
of goods or products • • • sold • • • by the named insured
occurring after the insured has relinquished posscssion thereof to others .•• " Endorsement number 4 was executed on
April 1, 1952, and pl·ovided that retroactive to May 1, 1951,
the "exclusion of products liability endorsement number 1 is
cancelled l1at."
The policy provides that' it applies to
accidents taking place during the policy period.
[3] l'laintiif contends that since endorsement 1 excluded
liability for any breach of warranty of goods soJd after the
insured had relinquished possession thereof to others, its
cancelJation by endorsement 4 must be interpreted as providing coverage to the extent theretofore excluded, and that

)
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aeeoroing1y damages for breach or warranty in the sale of
the doors wcrc necessarily covered. There is no merit in this
contention. Eacll of the endorsements contains the provision:
"Nothing herein contained shall be held to vary, alter, waive
or extend any of the terms, conditions, provisions, agreements
or limitations of the nnderruentioned Policy, other than as
above stated." Coverage A provides for bodily injury liability. Coverage C inclndes damages "because of injury to or
destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof,
caused by accident." Exclusion (e) excepts "injury to or
•destruction of (1) any goods or products .•. sold ... by the
· Insured • . . out of which the accident arises. " Endorsement 1 is an additional products liability exclusion. It
· excludes products liability for damage to property other than
the products themselves and bodily injuries. It neither increases the coverage nor limits the exclusions otherwise provided. and its cancellation by its express terms leaves such
coverage and exclusions fully intact. Accordingly, plaintiff
cannot recover under the policy unless the damages were
damages "because of injury to or destruction of property,
including loss of use thereof, caused by accident," and were
not damages because of "injury to or destruction of (1) any
goods or products ••• sold • • . by the Insured . . • out. of
which the accident arises."
[4] Defendant contends that there was no injury to or
destruction of property caused by accident. No all-inclusive
definition of the word "accident" can be given. It has been
defined" as 'a casualty-something out of the usual course of
events and which happens suddenly and unexpectedly and
without design of the person injured. t (Rock v. TraveZer.
1m. Co., 172 Cal. 462. 465 [156 P. 1029, L.R.A. 1916E 1196];
Richards v. Travelers Ins. Co., 89 Cal. 170, 175 [26 P. 762, 23
Am.St.Rep. 455].)" (Zuckerman v. Underwriters at LZoyd'.,
42 Cal.2d 460, 473 [267 P.2d 7'17].) It" 'includes any event
which takes placc without thc fot-csight or expectation of the
person actcd upon or affected by the event.'" (Richards v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 89 Cal. 170. 176 [26 P. 726. 23 Am.St.Rep.
455] ; see also Ritchic v. Anchor Casualty Co., 135'Cal.App.
2d 245, 252-253 [286 P.2d 1000] ; Moore v. Fidel.ity & Cas.
Co., 140 Ca1.App.2d Supp. 967, 971 [295 P.2d 154].)
[5] "Accident, as a source and cause of damage to property,
within the terms of an accident policy, is an unexpected,
unforeseen, or undesigned happening or consequence from
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either a known or an unknown cause." (Hauenstein v. Saini
Paul-Mercury Indcm. Co., 242 Minn. 354 [65 N.W.2d 122,
126].) [6] The door failures were unexpected, undesigned,
and unforeseen. They were not the result of normal deterioration, but occurred long before any properly constructed door
'might be expected to wear out or collapse. Moreover, they
occurred suddenly. It bears emphasis that we are concerned,
not with a series of imperceptible events that finally culminated in a single tangible harm (c/., CaMdian Radium ct
Uranium Corp. v. Indemnity 1m. Co., 342 Ill.App. 456
[97 N.E.2d 132, 139-140]), but with a series of specific events
each of which manifested itself at an identifiable time and
each of which caused identifiable harm at the time it occurred. ,
The trial court found that "these defects, in some cases, I
developed within a few day$ after [the doors] were installed I
and in some cases as much as six months elapsed after the '
doors were installed, but that eventually all the original 760 •
doors so sold and delivered by the California Aluminum to '
plaintiff proved defective and feU apart. That said doors '
sagged on their hinges, went out of shape, they dragged on :
the floors and the inside parts of said doors fell out. That'
when said doors came apart they would frequently lock themselves in place and could not be opened. In other cases doors
that were closed and locked 'Would faU apart and come open.
That when the dwelling houses were occupied by purchasers,
as hereinafter set forth, the occupants would frequently leave
their premises with the doors closed and locked and on their
return find the doors had come apart and the houses were
wide open. That in many cases, by reason of these defects in
the doors, it was impossible for the occupants to lock the
doors, or even to close the doors at night. That when temperatures arose in the houses the said doors would also emit noises
that sounded like the explosion of fire crackers." Thus, although it may have taken many months for all of the doors
to fail and fan apart, it is clear that each door, when it
failed, failed suddenly. At one moment it was a usable door,
at the next it was not. Had the door failure res111ted in direct
physical injury to the houses, the accidental cause of the harm
would be obvious, but other harms flowing from the door
failures were likewise accidental1y caused. Accordingly, the
crucial issue is which, if any, of these harms were within
the policy coverage.
It is not disputed that injury to or destruction of the

Feb. 1959)

GEDDES

&

SMITH, INC. ". ST. PAUL MEaCUBY
INDEMNITY Co.

565

(51 C.M 1158; 334 P.ld 8811

doors themselves was excluded by exclusion (e). Plaintiff
contends, however, that both the houses and its business were
damaged by the door failures. With respect to the houses
its position is supported by Hauenstein v. Saint Paul-Mercurll
Indem. Co., 242 Minn. 354 [65 N.W.2d 122]. In that case
the in.sured sold defective plaster that was used to plaster a
house. The plastcr shrank and cracked to such an extent
that it was of no value and had to be removed so that the
walls and ceilings eould be replac;tered with a different material. Injury to the plaster itself was excluded from coverage.
The court held, however, that injury to the house had
occurred and was covered under a clause identical with
Coverage C in the present case. "No one can reasonably contend that the application of a useless plaster, which has to be
rcmoved before the walls can be properly replastered, does
not lower the market value of a building. Although the
injury to the walls and ceilings can be rectified by removal
of the defective plaster, nevertheless, the presence of the
defeetive plaster on the walls and ceilings reduced the value
of the building and constitutl'd property damage. The measure of damages is the diminution in the market value of the
building, or the cost of removing tbe defective plaster and
restoring the building to its former condition plus any loss
from deprival of use, whichever is the lesser." (68 N.W.2d
at 125.) In Vol! v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 50 Cal.
2d 373 [325 P.2d 987], a case also involving defective plaster,
we distinguished the Hauenstein case on the ground that in
the Volf case it was not necessary to remove the defective
plaster before replastering the house. In the present case,
however, it was necessary to remove the defective doors before
they could be replaced, and we see no reason for not following
the Hauenstein case and permitting recovery for damages
to the houses according to the rule stated therein.
[7] Plaintiff's judgment against the insured was not limited to such damages. In addition to costs of removal of the
doors and loss of use of the houses, it included the other costs
of handling the defective doors and their replacements, loss
of profits, and loss of goodwi11. Plaintiff contends, however,
that these additional items of damages constituted damages
10 its busiuess and goodwill and were thert-fore damages
"because of injury to or de~1ruction of property." We cannot agree with this contention.
When coverage C is read in the light of the exclusions
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applicable thereto, it is clear that the word property refeI'lt~
to physical or tangible property. Thus it is such property,··
: not goodwill or a business entity, that is ordinarily thought
of as the subject of usc, and it is to damage to such property
· that all of the cxclusions are directcd. Any breach of contract may harm the business of the injured party, and if sumciently serious, may affect his goodwill. Such damages, howevcr, are not commonly thought of as injuries to or destruc· tion of property within the meaning of a public liability
· insurance policy. Defendant did not undertake to insure
against all breaches of contract caused by accident. It required an injury to or destruction of property and excluded
· injury to or destruction of goods or products sold by the
insured. The significance of this exclusion would be obvious
had the defects appeared before any of the doors had been
installed. In such event it could not be seriously contended
that an injury to property other than the doors had occurred
within the meaning of the policy even though plaintiff's inability to use them seriously interfered with its business and
injured its goodwill. Such damages are no less outside the
coverage of the policy because there was also damage to the
houses.
To summarize, it appears from the specific facts
found that there was injury to the houses caused by accident
and that therefore the trial court's conclusion to the contrary
cannot stand. Since the judgment against Aluminum Products, however, also included additional elements of damages
not covered by defendant's policy, we cannot grant plaintiff's
motion to amend the findings and enter judgment for the
full amount sought in its favor.
The motion to amend the findings is denied and the judgment is reversed for further proceedings in accord with the
views herein expressed.
Gibson, C. J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment and in the majority
opinion exe~pt the reasoning therein that the case of Voll v.
Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 50 Ca1.2d 373, 377 [325 P.2d
987], is distinguishable from Hauenstein v. Saint Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 242l\1illn. 354 [65 N.W.2d 122], relied upon
in support of the con elusion reached in the case at bar. In
my opinion the conclusion reached by a majority of this court
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in the instant case is inl'ol1sistf'nt with that reached by it in
the Volf case. In my diR.<;cnting opinion in the Volf case I set
forth in detail the reasons wIlY the insurance policy there
involved was ambiguous and why, under the decided cases,
. \;uc~ ambiguity should be resolved ill favor of the insured.
I pointed out that the primary fnnction of insurance is to
insure-to provide full coverage of the indicated risk. Businessmen are not usually lawyers and in the normal course of
events must rely on the agents of insurance companies when
buying insurance. If this court continues to "interpret"
patently ambiguous and inconsistent clauses in insurance policies to the detriment of the insured rather than resolving such
ambiguities in his favor, the door will be opened for still more
ambiguities and even less insurance coverage for the money
expended than is presently the case. It is my view that this
court could, and should, when such an ambiguous policy is
before it, hold without equivocation that the provisions which
are confusing and ambiguous as to the liability covered will
be resolved in favor of the insured. If a few of such forthright
decisions were rendered by this court in this 1ield it would not
be long before insurance policies were more clearly and understandably written to express the true intent of the parties
and there would be less litigation involving insurance policies.
SPENCE, J.-I dissent.
The policy coverage was limited to "liability imposed •••
because of injury to or destruction of property. • • • caused
'by acciiknt." (Emphasis added.) The trial court found:
"That it is not true that any of the defects in any of said
doors or any of the expenses incurred or losses sustained by
plainti1f was caused by accident." In my opinion this was
the only 1inding which the trial court could properly have
made under the undisputed facts. There was no "sudden and
unexpected" event or anything which happened "suddenly
and unexpectedly" so as to bring the situation within any
accepted meaning of the phrase "injury to or destruction of
property, •.• caused by accident." (Zuck$rman v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 42 Ca1.2d 460, 473 [267 P.2d 777] ; Rock v.
Travelers Ins. 00., 172 Cal. 462, 465 [156 P. 1029, L.R.A .
. 1916E 1196]; Richards v. TraveZersIns. 00.,89 Cal. 170, 175
[26 P. 762, 23 Am.St.Rep. 455].) Thus, the effect of the majority opinion is to convert a so-called public liability policy,
limited to liability imposed for damage ., caused by accident,' t

)
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; into an agreement to indemnify the insured against
for the insured's failure faithfully to perform its contractuar:
obligations regardless of the showing of any "accident."
oJ
In Voll v. Ocean Accident & Quar. Corp., 50 Ca1.2d 373 [325
P.2d 987], a somewhat similar policy was involved. This
court found it unnecessary there to determine the scope of .
the insuring clause using the term "caused by accident,';
as the facts clearly brought the situation within one of the :
exclusionary clauses of the policy. (Ibid, p. 375.) In my opin~ I
ion, this court could have properly reached the same resulf'
in the Volf case by holding that the facts did not bring the'
situation within the plain provisions of the insuring clause.'
This court there distinguished Hatlenstei1& v. Saint Paul-Mercurg Indem. Co., 242 Minn. 354 [65 N.W.2d 122], but in the
present case, the majority relies upon that case to support its i
position. I do not believe that the cited case was correctly •
decided, and therefore I would not follow it.
The majority opinion also cites and relies upon Ritchie v.
Anchor Ca81laZtg Co., 135 Cal.App.2d 245 [286 P.2d 10001.
The policy there was quite similar, insuring against liability
for damages "caused by accident." The insured sold rancid
peanut oil which was used by its customer in the manufacture
of food products. The use of such oil by its customer •• ruined
all food products in which it was used, and damaged the machinery employed in the manufacture of same." (P. 252.)
The court there quoted the approved definition of accident
as something •r which happens suddenly and unexpectedly"
(p. 253) and held that the liability of the insured was embraced within the terms of the insuring clause. Unlike the
present case, the use of the rancid peanut oil there" suddenly
and unexpectedly" caused damage to both the entire mass of
the food product into which it was mixed and to the machinery
us~ in the processing. Here, nothing happened "suddenly
and unexpectedly" and there was no· damage to the houses
except for the fact that the doors themselves proved to be
.defective. It is therefore clear that the insured's liability
was not a liability for damage" caused by accident."
I 'Would affirm the judgment.
I

Shenk, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
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